government that oversee the affairs of local bodies. The federal government has also instituted a Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development for overall coordination and monitoring of local government affairs in the country (Planning Commission 1998). Many other government departments, autonomous bodies and semigovernment organizations also extend support and assistance to local government institutions. For example, the government created the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) in 1999 with an aim to reconstruct local governments and the police force. It devised a new system which was enforced from 2001. This is discussed in more detail in following sections.
There is well-defined hierarchy for urban management in Pakistan. This is outlined in Elections were again held in 2005. However, in 2010, the tenure of the elected regimes concluded, and they were replaced by appointed bureaucrats. Major constitutional changes are in the offing at present which will also have an impact on the status, structure and working of local governments.
Local institutional structure
As mentioned earlier, the Karachi Improvement Trust and later Karachi Development • Master planning/planning coordination/environmental control/urban design/urban renewal
• Building codes and planning standards
• Provision/development of public Housing
• Providing technical assistance to the other bodies (when required)
• Land management and developmental control
• Maintenance of infrastructure (in coordination with KWSB)
• Mass-transit planning
• Development of low cost housing
Its sources of revenue were land sales and development charges.
Urban management functions rested with KMC till 2001. They included:
• Maintenance of urban areas, parks and recreation grounds
• Community services/amenities such as hospitals, dispensaries, maternity homes and schools
• Leasing of public property for development or other use
• Roads and street maintenance
• Coordination in planning and development activities
• Solid waste management
• Fire fighting services
• Squatter settlements
Its sources of revenue included Octroi (a tax imposed on the goods transported by road and rail until 1999 when it was abolished); property taxes levied on fully occupied and utilized property; road tolls; and fire services and conservancy taxes. In addition, occasional grants were obtained from the federal and provincial governments for specific projects. [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] . However, these plans were not notified, and as political and administrative support to the department began to dwindle, most of its staff and associated expert pool either sought employment in the private sector or left the country.
When the next master planning exercise began in the early 2003, only a bare minimum of human resources remained. Thus this exercise was handed over to a private firm. This approach had many short comings as the said firm did not possess the overall competence and capability to undertake a large scale task of this nature.
As mentioned earlier, both KDA and KMC merged into the City District Government Delivery of services in Karachi is now undertaken by a complex web of multiple agencies with either singular or shared jurisdictions. This is shown in Table 1 . enjoy the patronage of political leaders as these settlements constitute the major voting banks for the political parties.
• Transporters: They are responsible for running the entire passenger and goods transport system of the city, and influence policies and projects related to the development of roads, alignment of passenger/goods routes, and fares.
• Religious pressure groups: Though their electoral influence is dwindling, they constitute a strong pressure group due to 'street power'. That is to say, the religious lobbyists possess within their folds a considerable number of staunch followers and activists who are used in street protests, demonstrations and agitation.
• Thus planning exercises at the city level tend to be somewhat academic. Moreover, while the planning process improved in its methodology and execution, there are several shortcomings in content. The city of Karachi is grossly deficient in basic maps, property records, and physical and socio-economic inventories. As a result of the lack of adequate data, planning assumptions have been drawn from sample surveys. This has led to underor over-estimations. Each attempt at planning has focused on addressing this vital deficiency. The Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 is no exception, but since it was conceived as a finite consultancy project, the creation of a multipurpose data base could not be effectively pursued.
A wide gap has usually prevailed between the planning process and social, economic, administrative, and practical realities. This has become extremely visible during the last decade. The Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 has been criticized for this reason.
The plan does not deal sufficiently or realistically with environment related issues nor take into consideration various social and political factors that have a direct bearing on the way the city is governed and development takes place. No viable institutional arrangements have been developed to oversee the implementation of the plan, although a clear analysis of the institutional issues involved was one of the outputs of the planning process.
Therefore the intended implementation process is not sustainable because: (a) there is no political support for the plan from provincial government; (b) there are no institutional arrangements for inter-agency transfer of information or data; (c) there is only lukewarm commitment to the planning process; (d) organizational culture within the CDGK is a major hindrance; and (e) the plan has not sought to develop links with the NGOs, informal sector, communities, and other development lobbyists whose support is essential to achieve its objectives.
Another problem with metropolitan planning is that each time the process has started afresh: the previous plan was consulted merely as a passing reference. Never until the most recent effort was an evaluation conducted to review the performance of past plans, and while the present plan did attempt an evaluation, it was confined only to basic records, not the review and analysis of developments on the ground.
It is also interesting to note that those groups who actually decide on the fate of the city were not invited to the policy or plan-making exercise. Transporters, shopkeepers, estate agents, brokers, dealers, religious and political groups, professionals, builders, and businessmen remained aloof throughout the process. Nor were local communities or the general public involved.
Lessons Learned
A viable political system that is capable of transforming populist aspirations into an agenda for development is a pre-requisite for any sustainable urban planning process.
This process exists to some extent in Karachi, but only basic statutory provisions are contained in the Sindh Local Government Ordinance 2001 and planning lacks the robust legal framework needed to place this vital activity on a firm footing. In particular, better coordinated management of land is fundamental to an improved planning process, and planning and urban management institutions must have the ability to generate enough revenue to support their functions.
and region. It must be understood that Karachi is more than a city; it is an expanded urban region. If we fail to give direction to its growth and sustenance, the city will become a melting pot of problems. Karachi is a mini-Pakistan as far as its composition is concerned. Therefore views from each discipline of learning and every section of society are vital to shape a consensus on the future of the metropolis. Furthermore, it is essential to initiate debates on crucial planning issues to raise popular awareness among the people. Although the newspapers and magazines are doing commendable work, it needs to be reinforced by the efforts from the electronic media which has a greater reach into the masses. CDGK could seek to create this institutional space.
Demonstration planning projects have a key role to play. A few of the town councils of Karachi should be selected for this purpose. Plans could be developed initially for those towns and after suitable review, evaluation and modification, the lessons learned may be extended to all the remaining jurisdictions in a systematic manner.
In order to develop a stronger professional base, universities and research institutions should be involved in the process. The universities should develop relevant specialized program whereby they become capable of providing professional support to this vital activity. According to their capacity and past performance, universities should be directly involved at least during the fact finding and evaluation phases of planning. Also, instead of creating competition, the approach of fostering collaboration between institutions should be promoted to gain benefit from the strengths of all concerned.
Planning is not a product; it is a continuous ongoing process and needs to be treated as such.
